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The Department of the Army has requested the U.S.
Combat Developments Command develop a methodology for deter-
mining operational hit probabilities for three pilot man-
weapons systems, one of which is the M-60 tank, where the
operating personnel are subjected to the psychological and
physiological stresses of the simulated combat environment.
This thesis describes a proposed experimental methodology
applicable to the time frame FY 1969 and beyond for obtain-
ing hit probabilities to include the preliminary experi-
mental unit firing exercises and method of selection, the
courses to be fired, the instrumentation requirements,
several statistical techniques to be used in data reduction,
a format for presenting the resulting data and the costs
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1. Introduction
What is the expected operational (combat) hit probabil-
ity for a 105 mm, M-60 tank cannon fired in an attack
against an aggressor medium tank dug in at a range of 1500
meters somewhere on the plains of Central Europe on a clear
winter day?
The hypothetical question posed is typical of those
posed in the US Army since the early 1960 's when concern
developed in the Department of Defense over comparison of
weapons systems to determine how the DOD budget should be
spent to get the most utility (effectiveness) for the
dollars spent on weapons systems. The heart of this problem
is the effectiveness of the man-weapon system, that is, what
is the target effect per round, shots, burst, etc. Although
it is recognized that target hits, as well as the subsequent
terminal effects, will be determined by the laws of probabil-
ity; Army agencies have not yet conducted sufficient study
and experimentation to estimate the appropriate parameters
so that operational predictions can be made. Even the basic
weapon, the rifle, the principal arm of the "Queen of Battle"
in the US Army, has only recently been effectively measured
on a simulated battlefield where firers were stressed with
live fire against pop-up targets and real time decisions as
to which targets to engage. With the rapid evolution of the
applications of operations research and systems analysis to
the solution of the problem of just how operationally effec-
tive is any particular man-weapon system, the Army, as well
as the sister services, has undertaken the development of
experimental methodology to measure system effectiveness.
In 1965, the Department of the Army directed the Combat
Developments Command, which is responsible for how the Army
will be organized, how it will be equipped and how it will
fight, to conduct a study to develop the methodology by
which information on operational hit probabilities for all
Army systems could be obtained. (OHP refers to the proba-
bility that a crew, or single firer, under the stress of
combat conditions will hit a particular target, which should
logically be combined with conditional kill given hit data
to yield unconditional probability of kill.) The resultant
information would be invaluable for use by operations
researchers, system analysts, war gamers and military plan-
ners. In 1965 only nuclear weapons had been satisfactorily
tabled to permit researchers and planners to make compara-
tive analyses of effectiveness. Department of the Army
specified that it would review CDC's study results to deter-
mine if the development of OHP should become an ongoing
program to develop OHP for all Army weapons systems except
long range missiles.
Recognizing that a change in any one of the eight
typical variables in our hypothetical question meant a new
question was asked, CDC considered the magnitude of the
solution to the OHP problem. For example, in tank systems,
allowing for a minimum of three types of US tanks with two
types of main gun ammo, four tactical postures for US and
aggressor weapons systems, four principal ranges, five
typical aggressor target complexes to include moving tank
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targets, five types of terrain, three visibility conditions
and three temperature levels, there are 21,600 combinations
to be considered. Each combination would require the firing
of at least 30 rounds of main gun ammo (see Appendix A) at an
approximate cost of $80 (if the opportunity cost is consid-
ered equal to the cost of a new round) for a total of nearly
$52 million in ammo cost just to observe first round hits.
This figure does not include the cost of pay and travel and
per diem allowances for the experimenters and test subjects,
vehicle transportation, operation and maintenance costs,
cost of constructing and maintaining the instrumented targets,
and the cost of analyzing the test data and publication of
the results. And this only for tank systems; there were
many more systems besides the tank which could be considered
in the study. The immediate conclusion drawn was that large
costs were involved and the question that followed was what
methodology should be used to determine weapon system OHP
satisfactorily at a cost the Army could afford. The words
satisfactorily and afford are very elusive; however, both
will be amplified in the material which follows.
At this point in time the Army's budget included no
obligational authority for the OHP program. Past experimen-
tation had looked into only a few of the individual compon-
ents of OHP, and, therefore, could only serve as a partial
guide to point the way for future experimentation. The big
question still remained, "Could a methodology be developed
to obtain weapons systems OHP at a cost the Army could
afford?" The scarce resource is money. CDC in coordination
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with the Army Material Command and the Continental Army
Command, responsible for the Army's hardware and troop train-
ing respectively, met and agreed that a reduced pilot program
should be carried out first to permit the decision maker at
DA level to determine if the OHP data that could be obtained
was worth the cost and thereby determine if the program
should be continued by examining all weapons systems except
long range missiles. The pilot program outlined would
address a typical tank, infantry and artillery weapon system
which would serve to reduce the scope of the initial study.
With this accomplished CDC forwarded the mission to its
experimental command, CDCEC, to conduct the pilot program
with the 105 mm gun tank, the 155 mm self propelled howitzer
and the hand held grenade launcher. CDCEC was tasked to
develop the methodology for determining OHP for each weapons
system and to identify problem areas, which implies identifi-
cation of costs involved. The use of "on the shelf" valid
data from arsenals, the Ballistics Research Laboratories and
from previous field experiments such as those run by O.R.O.
(later R.A.C.) and the Human Engineering Laboratories was
encouraged to avoid costly duplication. Likewise combat
data could contribute to the study.
Although CDC had reduced the scope of the problem con-
siderably by restricting the initial study to only three
weapons systems, there were still many unknowns and only
Conference on Preparation of a Coordinated. .
.
Selected US Army Weapons Systems (Memorandum for Record.
Ft. Belvoir: USACDC, 27 March 1964), pp 1-7.
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locally available funds with which to defray costs. CDCEC
formed a pilot study team to which it gave the following
mission in five parts.
a. "Develop procedures, techniques and method-
ologies to be utilized in data collection, reduction
and correlation to obtain standardized tactical
effectiveness data on weapons to be examined."
b. "Develop the format for portraying the
tactical effectiveness data of weapons examined."
c. "Determine the psychological and physio-
logical environments influencing hit probabilities
and develop objective meaningful measurements of
variables and effective control of constants."
d. "Determine, for project analysis purposes,
data requirements for appropriate experiments in the
USACDCEC Experimentation Program."
e. "Determine the feasibility of a follow-on
program. "1
In the accomplishment of its mission the pilot study team
must research past experimental work in order to gain insight
into the development of methodology and problems involved in
conducting a reduced scale pilot OHP study for three specific
weapons systems. It must also publish data requirements to
the experimentation teams which will conduct field experi-
ments with the specified weapons. Because of the limited
funds available for the study, the pilot program cannot be
an exhaustive study of all situations, terrain, etc., but,
must be conducted in sufficient detail to provide the
decision maker with the necessary information upon which
to base his decision of whether to request obligational
Clarification of TEWS Study Group Memorandum of
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authority to initiate a full blown program, continue the
pilot program with locally available funds or stop the opera-
tion.
Thus the stage is set for the specific approach to be
taken in this thesis which will be to restrict attention to
the 105 mm gun tank system and to consider only the develop-
ment of parts "a-c" of the pilot study mission with emphasis
on developing an experimental methodology. The proposed
methodology will address all three weapons sub-systems on
the M-60 tank, the 105 mm main gun, the coaxial 7.62 mm
machine gun and the caliber .50 machine gun in the non-toxic
environment. The employment of all weapons sub-systems
during a tactical engagement is felt to be essential to real-
ism and the maintenance of the stress factor on the crew.
The time frame to which the proposed methodology is
applicable is FY 1969 and beyond, when reliable, sophis-
ticated instrumentaion systems, to include a high speed,
large memory capacity digital computer capable of real time
decisions as well as data recording, and a direct fire hit
and miss location sensor are predicted could be available
in addition to the instrumentation systems already proven
reliable, all of which are considered necessary to evaluate
a group of tank systems operating over relatively extended
distances. The views and opinions expressed are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the official
position of the Combat Developments Command Experimental
Command.
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The problem will be addressed in three major parts.
First, a look will be taken at what research agencies have
accomplished in the past to adopt all procedures, techniques
and facts which are usable. Second, a methodology will be
described for the conduct of field experimentation to fill
in gaps not covered by past experiments. Finally the appli-
cable cost will be described. Throughout the criterion is
to minimize cost subject to a satisfactory level of experi-
mentation and data gathering effectiveness.
In that the pilot program need not examine every firing
combination in order to be used as a decision model, there
are several methods which may be employed to reduce the cost
of the M-60 tank portion of the pilot program without reduc-
ing the validity of the results.
(a) In the 105 mm gun tank pilot experimental
program fire only two types of main gun ammo, the high ex-
plosive antitank practice round (HEAT-TP) and the high ex-
plosive plastic round (HEP-T) . (If ammo allowances and the
instrumentation capability permit, the armor piercing
(APDS-T) round could be included and HEAT-T could be used
rather than HEAT-TP.)
(b) Use pooled equipment at one test site and
address only one type of terrain.
(c) Consider only three aggressor tank complexes
(1) tanks and armored carriers of near tank size, both moving
and stationary, (2) antitank guns and (3) rocket launcher
teams, automatic weapons teams and troops. The tanks and
armored carriers would be engaged by main guns only, the
\ 16
antitank guns would be engaged with any gun with the range
capability and rocket launcher teams, automatic weapons teams
and the troops would be engaged with the machine guns.
(d) Assume temperature to be of secondary impor-
tance.
These methods reduce " the variables , and" hence costs, to
four tactical situations (attack, defense, delay and meeting
engagement), four principal ranges (600, 1100, 1500 and 1900
meters for the main gun; 600, 1100 and 1500 meters for the
caliber .50 machine gun and 600 meters and below for the
7.62 mm machine gun), three types of target complexes as
just described, and three visibility conditions (day, clear;
night, clear and reduced visibility such as dawn, dusk or
haze) . In the day defense and day delay it may be desirable
to add a longer range for the main gun. The variables are
considered the minimum desired; however, each combination
may be ranked so that if budgetary limitations impose further
reductions, the test director would readily know which com-
binations have priority.
The following priority matrix is recommended based on
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Because costs are large and may exceed whatever budget
is allocated, it behooves us to look for other ways to re-
duce the total cost without falling below the desired level
of experimental effectiveness. If priorities 1 through 6
or at least 1 through 3 are executed an additional saving
may be possible during the experiment if statistical tests
show that for the same set of variables for the attack and
meeting engagement and the defense and the delay, the
hypothesis may be accepted that the estimated hit probabil-
ities are respectively the same. Intuitively one would
expect the two variations of the offense and the two varia-
tions of the defense to be quite similar. The statistical
test to be performed is outlined in Appendix B and the
appropriate time for its use and the expected saving will
be discussed in a later section when the detailed experi-
ment is developed.
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2. Past Experiments Guide the Future
There have been two past experiments which input
significantly into the development of the methodology for
determining tank system OHP . In 1955 PROJECT STALK studied
the time required for an individual tank crew to engage
surprise targets. Since this experiment was conducted be-
fore the use of instrumented target systems, much of the
measurement had to be accomplished by personnel (recorders)
mounted in seats fastened to the rear of the tank turret,
using Esterline-Angus pen recorders to record the time at
which target detection, identification, and engagement took
place.
In 1956-57, PROJECT ARNO , ARNO stands for armor night
operations, compared the ability of a tank platoon to
2
engage simulated targets during day and night attack.
From these experiments the researcher may conclude that
considerable useful data for the M-48 series medium tank,
one of the two medium tanks in the current inventory, was
collected under conditions approximating those found on the
battlefield; however, no experimental data was obtained on
the 105 mm gun tank, our test subject. Experimental method-
ology for obtaining operational hit probabilities and time
to fire distributions were developed in both experiments.
Some improvements are now possible due to technological
D.C. Hardison, et al., A Partial Analysis of Project
STALK Data with Results of Single Tank Versus Single Tank
Duels (BRL Tech Note 980, February 1955), pp. 6-14.
2
J. A. Bruner, et al., Project ARNO Night and Day




advances in instrumentation which can and should be included
in this experiment and they are described as follows.
(a) Although the heart of the problem is the OHP
of an individual tank, this OHP cannot be accurately deter-
mined out of context. That is, it must be measured as in
ARNO under the stress of the command and control problem of
directing and distributing the fires of all tanks in a unit
against multiple targets. Only through empirical observation
of platoons or companies can predictions be made about
platoons or companies. ARNO disclosed weaknesses in the
state of training with respect to proper fire distribution
which should be further examined in the study of OHP.
Therefore in the pilot program we want to observe not
only the hit probability for each armor defeating round fired
and area effects for all other rounds, but also the degree
of underkill or overkill. In keeping with the experimental
criterion, the platoon is the minimum size which provides
an appropriate level of command and control stress; however,
in any follow on program, consideration should be given to
raising the level to reinforced company level to more fully
evaluate the effect of massed armor firepower employing
fire and maneuver by platoon.
(b) Targets should be 3D whenever feasible to
provide realistic targets for detection and identification
and should be capable of being electronically controlled.
The instrumentation on the armored targets should be capable
of sensing with reasonable precision and recording with the
computer when and where the targets have been hit and when
21
eparate panels are bolted
onto a body frame. If HEAT-T
is to be fired, panels should
be metal.
A proposed tank target to supplement the Bisset-Berman
reduced scale tank target currently available. The engine
is mounted in extreme rear and as low as possible. Whenever
possible, the chassis would be put in some defilade to pro-
tect drive mechanism. With the turret removed this would be
an armored personnel carrier.
^k
% *»
Proposed antitank target incorporating currently avail-
able pop-up target sensing system with the sensing silhouette
replaced with "F" type cardboard target, which falls down
when hit and sends this sensing to the computer.
This same system less the AT gun is proposed for troop,




and where the round passed in relation to the target if it
missed. After each run, it is recommended that the hits be
personally checked to ensure only main gun rounds were
scored as hits. The 3D tank targets envisioned would look
like the ones depicted in figure 2. There are tank targets,
called Bisset-Berman target tanks, which are currently
available and have all the desired characteristics except
a sensing device to record accurately the time and location
of hits and misses. With the appropriate modification to
mount a sensor system, the Bisset-Berman is a satisfactory
tank target. Previous experiments recorded the first hit
as a kill, whereas, this was not necessarily true. Since
then, computer programs have been developed which now allow
the computer to determine quickly, from inputs from hit re-
cording devices and by applying Monte Carlo techniques, if
a hit should be credited as no significant damage, a fire-
power kill, mobility kill or total kill. Having made a
determination, the computer can update instructions to the
target so it will respond realistically. Thus if a tank
crew fires and achieves a hit but fails to relay and fire
again when the target is still threat, we can note this fact
A damaged tank is like a wounded elephant; it must be assum-
ed to be dangerous until proven otherwise.
The personnel targets or weapons targets manned by
personnel would be engaged by tank weapons which achieve
area effect. Each personnel target should be capable of
falling down when it is hit by either a machine gun bullet
or by a fragment from a high explosive round and should be
23
capable of sensing through its "halo effect" when near
misses are occurring. The "halo" in effect senses suppres-
sive fire.
(c) Several tactical postures must be considered,
i.e., the attack, defense, delay and meeting engagement are
all important. So far only the attack, day and night, have
been explored in ARNO.
(d) Although statistical control must be exer-
cised in order to obtain meaningful results, control must
allow real time exercises and as much movement as possible
to be used to stress the tank crews and hence tend to
simulate the battlefield realistically. It should be noted,
tank cannon are inherently accurate because of their long
gun tubes and carefully manufactured ammunition. Tank
cannon laid under optimum conditions are capable of strik-
ing a target in excess of 80% of the time located at 1500
meters distance. As a matter of fact the bulk of the rounds
will strike within 24 inches of the aiming point. Yet field
experience has shown every tank leader that his crews seldom
equal or exceed the limit of the system when movement and
real time stresses are applied such as in ARNO or the tank
crew gunnery qualification table (a moving, real time exer-
cise fired day and night against both moving and stationary
targets) due largely to aiming errors.
The statistical control limitations on movement during
the time of the firing engagement would be to require the
platoon to limit its maneuver to selection and occupation
of primary and alternate firing positions. Thus all tanks
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would be firing from approximately the same sample range
bracket, which we shall specify to be 100 meters plus or
minus measured from the basic range sampling points. The
target control program would obtain the range between the
tank platoon and the targets through the direct range meas-
uring system and would present targets soon after the range
fell within a prescribed bracket. For example, let us say
the next set of targets in an attack exercise are to be
engaged at 1600 - 1400 meters (the 1500 meter bracket)
.
Soon after the platoon enters the bracket the computer
would cause the targets to appear and fire on the attacking
US platoon. The platoon engages the targets with fire and
limited maneuver. The result is felt to be a workable com-
promise between tactical realism and statistical control.
In the offense as the US platoon moves to the objective,
targets will appear randomly to the right and left and at
near and far ranges so that the platoon may engage its
initial set of targets at the 1500 meter bracket, fire at
several more target sets at different ranges and later fire
another exercise at the 1500 meter bracket. In the defense
we would exercise the same sort of fire engagement control.
We will comment more on this control when we discuss the
defense in detail.
(e) Although ARNO considered night operations,
periods of reduced visibility such as dawn, dusk or periods
of similar dim light intensity have not been explored. Be-
cause these periods have been historically used by armed
forces the world over, they deserve attention also.
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These deficiencies will be corrected in the proposed
methodology to follow. By using more sophisticated instru-
mentation we hope to get more valid results in a form that
lends itself to more rapid data processing.
Zb
3. What Must be Measured
In a tank firing experiment there are three vital
points to be measured for the experimental unit, the tank,
employed in its normal platoon role. The first is accuracy,
i.e., for a specific type of main gun ammo, light condition,
range, state of target movement, the sequence number of the
round and tactical situation what is the mean and standard
deviation of the aiming point in the Y-Z plane. (In using
the standard 3 coordinate system, we mean that Y and Z
describe the plane perpendicular to the axis of fire, the X
axis.) After the main gun is boresighted and zeroed accord-
ing to accepted doctrine for the wind and temperature
conditions applicable to a test phase, the expected strike
of the round is the aiming point. The distribution of aim-
ing error is predicted to be influenced by the six basic
factors just mentioned, plus a number of other less signif-
icant parameters which will be lumped into the error term.
Four of the factors are included as arguments of a function
to indicate there is some reason to believe there may be
interaction between two or more of the factors. The attack
and meeting engagement are described in the first model and
the defense and delay are described in the second. The
2
error terms are assumed to be N(0,a.
.) , i = 1 (attack or





The attack and meeting engagement model is,
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The defense and delay model is,
V






™k' RVV RV + @ijMmno
Zijklmno " A * Ts i + A j + £(T"V RVV RV + eIjklmno
with the following definitions,
uY is the average y component of aiming error(attack or meeting engagement) before the
operational conditions are applied.
U
Z is the average z component of aiming error
« (attack or meeting engagement) before the
operational conditions are applied.
Ti, i 1,2,3,4, is the effect in the y or 2
direction due to the tactical situation.
A. j - 1,2, . . . . , is the effect in the y or 2
'J direction due to the type of round fired
in the attack or the meeting engagement.
The upper limit is not fixed to permit the
inclusion of more rounds if desired.
Tmk k 1,2, Is the effect In the y or 2 directiondue to whether the target is moving or
stationary in an attack or meeting engagement
situation.
Ra„ I = 1,2,3,4, is the effect in the y or 2
direction due to the £th range bracket in
an attack or meeting engagement situation.
V m « 1,2,3,4,5,6,7, is the effect in the y
©r 2 direction due to the visibility in an
attack or meeting engagement. (The seven
conditions are day, and night, dawn and
dusk w/white light or w/infrared.)
Ro n = 1,2,3, is the effect in the y or z
direction due to sequence number of the
round where we differentiate between first,
second and other rounds fired in the attack
or meeting engagement.
o o=l,2,3,....,t, is the oth round fired
by any one of the tanks in the platoon as
a group with the same i through nth
coordinate
.
The starred parameters for the defense and the delay are
defined similarly.
By applying the statistical tools listed in Appendix C
we can estimate the parameters necessary to determine OHP by
integrating over the entire target area presented. Also,
with the statistics described, OHP may be readily extended
to targets of somewhat different size and shape. Since the
y and z components of the aiming error for any single round
fired may be correlated, a test should be made during the
data reduction phase to determine if the general bivariate
normal distribution must be used with the appropriate
numerical approximations to integrate over the exposed
target area and yield OHP. (See Appendix C for further
development of the integration techniques.)
Appendix D contains a discussion of the evaluation of
p. ., , when the special case of no four, three or two factor
^ljklmn r '
interaction applies and we may accept the hypothesis (at the
prescribed level of significance) that for one or more fac-
tors the level of a factor does not affect hit probability.
Experimentally determined OHP may be combined with
mobility kill, firepower kill and total kill probabilities,
which are available from the Army's Ballistic Research
29
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PRIMARY DIRECT SIGHTING AND FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENTS.
FIGURE 3
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Laboratories, to yield the unconditional probability of a
kill by the following formula:
PKILL = PHIT X PKILL/HIT
With the machine guns we are concerned with both accuracy
and area effects, i.e., do we hit the personnel and do the
near misses lie within a designated suppressive fire dis-
tance?
Second, and equally important with accuracy, is the
speed with which a tank crew engages a target and the rapid-
ity with which successive rounds can be fired until destruc-
tion is achieved. Therefore time distributions for acquiring
and detecting the target, time to open fire, and time to
reload, relay and fire subsequent rounds and time to achieve
a kill or a prescribed level of area coverage must be
determined.
Third, and an offshoot of accuracy and speed of engage-
ment, is the underkill, overkill problem. By determining
the number of hits achieved after the computer declares
target destruction, we will be able to comment on the degree
of overkill. Underkill is defined to be failing to fire or
continuing to fire on a target threat which is intervisible,
a determination which the computer is also capable of
making.
From these three categories of measurements we can
answer the principal questions about OHP, but we can offer
little in the way of insight into why crews did or did not
achieve the level of hit probability we would expect for a
31
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SECONDARY DIRECT SIGHTING AND FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENTS.
FIGURE b
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given set of conditions. Although our experiment is capable
of being repeated, expense may preclude any follow-on in the
near future. Therefore it seems mandatory that a number of
additional measurements be taken along with the primary ones
in order that the data bank will contain sufficient informa-
tion for the subsequent studies which are sure to follow
this experiment.
The first item in this secondary set is a recording of
the sight picture as seen by the gunner through his gunner's
periscope. This recording will show what target was engaged
and will show the dispersion of the aiming cross and lead
lines for all rounds but the caliber.. 50, if the range and
ammo used by the gunner is indexed into the tank fire con-
trol computer. Previous experimenters have used gun cameras
split off the gunner's periscope to obtain the picture
desired.
The second item is the range and ammunition indexed in
the computer for rounds fired by the gunner. The HEP-T
high explosive round would not be measured unless the range
and HEP-T is indexed into the tank fire control computer
while the gunner laid on the target with the articulated
telescope. A camera mounted to take pictures of the face
of the computer would record the amount of superelevation
in the gun system at the time of firing which may be trans-
lated to range and compared with the gun to target range
recorded by the external computer to determine the disper-
sion in range estimation.
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1. RANGE SCALE.
2. SUPERELEVATION ACTUATOR SHAFT.
3. SUPERELEVATION OUTPUT SHAFT.
4. RANGE CORRECTION KNOB.
5. RANGE INPUT SHAFT.
6. SUPERELEVATION MIL COUNTER.
7. RHEOSTAT KNOB.
8. AMMUNITION INDICATOR.
9. SUPERELEVATION HAND CRANK.
10. RESET BUTTON.
11. RESET LIGHT INDICATOR.
12. AMMUNITION SELECTOR HANDLE.
13. CIRCUIT BREAKER.
14. OUTER (SUPERELEVATION) POINTER.
15. INNER (RANGE) POINTER.
ORD E59797
BALLISTIC COMPUTER (M13A2 OR M13A1D) CONTROLS.
FIGURE 5
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Wind velocity and cant are two more important secondary
factors. Each has an effect on the path which a round takes
Other items could be added to this secondary list. We would
not increase the list, however, if in making the measurement
we significantly detracted from the measurement of the pri-
mary areas of interest.
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4. The Experiment and the Course Layouts
So far we have discussed in general the tactical
situations, ranges, types of ammunition to be fired and the
targets. Now we will discuss the experiment and course lay-
outs which will lead to completing the description of the
instrumentation felt necessary to gather data on the primary
and secondary points being measured and then to describing
how the data should be processed and tabulated for presen-
tation.
To simulate the battlefield as closely as possible
and apply psychological and physiological stresses to the
experimental subjects, the experiment must fit into a tac-
tical maneuver executed on a typical terrain such as is
found at Ft. Irwin, California.
In general, each of the four tactical situations
would be examined during the day, night and dawn or dusk.
Dawn firing will be measured for one half the experimental
units and dusk firing the other one half. All units would
fire at night with one half the units using infrared illum-
ination and the other half using howitzer fired flare type
illumination and/or Xenon searchlight.
Let us next consider the number of experimental units
(tanks and crews) needed for this experiment. The number
of experimental units is a judgement factor. It is believed
that 40 units grouped in the normal manner in eight platoons
selected from four different battalions from at least three
different major organizations (divisions, separate brigades
or separate battalions) would provide a satisfactory sample
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size, since we want to observe at least 30 first round and
30 second round shots for each set of conditions. Platoon
selection should be on a random basis.
Randomizing platoons versus type of combat should be
accomplished to average out the learning effect from the
type of combat and the four principal ranges and thereby
better approximate the "average" platoon. For example, the
eight platoons would be grouped into four groups lettered




Randomization of Platoon Groups









A 3, D 4, D 1, D 2, D
B 4, D 1, N 2, D 3, N
C 2, N 3, D 4, N 1, D
D 1, N 2, N 3, N 4, N
2nd Series
D 3, D 4, D 1, D 2, D
C 4, D 1, N
.
2, D 3, N
B 2, N 3, D 4, N 1, D
A 1, N 2, N • 3, N 4, N
3rd Series
C 3, Dn 4, Dn 1, Dn 2, Dn
D 4, Dn 1, Dk 2, Dn 3, Dk
A 2, Dk 3, Dn 4, Dk 1, Dn
B 1/ Dk 2, Dk 3, Dk 4, Dk
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Thus the group designated "D" would fire the attack course
first at night. Group "C" would fire the attack course
second at night. All ranges would be sampled during a pla-
toon run. The first series for all groups would be fired
before commencing the second series. At the end of the first
series the sample proportion of hits for the attack and meet-
ing engagement and defense and delay should be compared to
test the hypothesis that for similar situations, light con-
ditions, ranges, etc., the proportions may be presumed to
be the same at the prescribed significance level. If the
results of the tests indicate certain or all of the hypo-
theses may be accepted, the test director would consider
omitting the respective meeting engagement or the delay
from the second and third series and thereby reduce variable
experimental costs and ammo costs.
Now let us consider a chronological description of
experimental events as viewed from a test platoon's point
of view. Within six months of the start of the experiment
selected platoons would fire all gunnery tables at home
station. (This is typical mobilization and deployment pro-
cedure for war time, the period we are simulating.)
Initially, upon arrival and after orientation in the
test area, the platoon would commence two days of field
maneuver. Then just preceding their first simulated combat
situation the platoon would fire the tank crew qualification
course with assigned vehicles after conducting boresighting
and zeroing exercises. This would simulate previous combat
experience or rehearsal by a new unit committed to combat.
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These maneuvers would set the stage for measurement under
average combat conditions and provide a build-up in the
stress level.
Platoons would cycle throughout all 4 phases for day,
night and limited visibility in approximately a 31 day period
according to the following suggested schedule. (Additional
free time should be added by the test director based on the
situation.) Assume group C is conducting its first cycle;
their activities would be programmed as follows.
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TABLE III
Platoon Cycle for One Series
Day 1 Arrival, initial orientation, administrative
inprocessing.
2 Draw equipment, prepare to move to the field.
3 Detailed orientation on experiment, prepare
to move to the field.
4-5 Two day non-firing platoon maneuver period in-
cluding road marches, occupation of assembly
areas, movement to attack positions, attack
situations, occupation of defensive areas and
execution of delay tactics.
6-7 Maintenance of equipment and prepare to fire.
8 Boresight and zero all weapons, correct weapon
or sight malfunctions.
9 Fire tank crew qualification courses, receive
first operation order.
10 Move to initial assembly area and commence
1st Series day delay and execute passage of
lines
.
11 Reorganize, receive new operation order, move
forward in preparation for night attack,
execute night attack. Secure objective.
Receive order to continue with day attack.
12 Continue attack after dawn - this attack will
be a meeting engagement. Receive order to
execute defense.
13 Continue occupation of defensive position,
maintenance of equipment, execute night defense
14-15 Return to base camp, maintenance, prepare for
next series.
16 Receive order to move to the field, confirm
zero.
17-23 2nd Series, confirm zero during last day in




We have previously discussed the target complexes in
some detail; but, before discussing the attack, a few com-
ments are appropriate. Targets must react on cue and give
reaction signatures to firers who in turn respond as the
situation dictates. This means the target must stop moving
when a mobility kill is achieved, stop firing when a fire-
power kill is achieved, emit smoke to simulate a total kill
when the tank is set afire, etc. The tank target should
move from primary firing positions to alternate positions
or at least give this impression to the attacking US platoon.
The target complexes to be engaged should be employed
according to aggressor doctrine situations which will be
described for each of the four tactical situations. A
significant point to be observed is that in aggressor attacks,
a numerical advantage of 5:1 to 7:1 is normal as compared
to the typical US ratio of 3:1. Aggressor mass attacks
were normal on the Eastern front in WWII and in Korea, and
are normal today in Viet-Nam.
During any single engagement when the US platoon is
attacking, a maximum of three targets would be exposed at
a time. This number is considered to be the reasonable upper
limit from the standpoint of our desired mass against the
enemy. This number also tends to keep the level of load
on the computer's real time target control subroutine and
hit recording subroutine at an acceptable level. In the
defense when the aggressor is attacking with a numerical
superiority of say 5:1, the platoon's fire would be control-
led by requiring the tanks to fire within specific subsectors.
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Subsectors overlap somewhat but not to the extent all tanks
fire at the same targets. (This is typical of unit SOP pro-
cedures in use today.) This technique simplifies the hit
recording subroutine by limiting the tanks that could have
fired a round at a target within a specific subsector.
In either the attack or the defense the computer solves
the question of whether a round fired is a first, second or
subsequent round by making use of the fact that there is a
relatively low probability that more than one tank will fire
its main gun at such a time that the rounds will arrive at
the target area (attack) or target subsector (defense) within
a very small increment of time on the order of five micro-
seconds. Thus the computer solves the problem by first
knowing where the targets are and gets an up to date sensing
on where the US platoon is through signals from the direct
range measuring system and second computing the time of
flight for a round fired by eligible tanks and screening the
list to see which one falls within the prescribed limits.
It then checks its round counter subroutine for that tank,
adds one more to the number fired and senses the location of
the hit or miss which it stores in the appropriate location
of memory for first, second and subsequent rounds. In theory
this plan should work; however, a combination of gun camera
recordings as well as film recordings taken through tele-
scopes fixed behind the line of departure (or some other
suitable location) will undoubtedly be required to back up
the computer and solve those cases where the best the comput-
er can do is designate which of several tanks could have
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fired a certain round. Then there would be the problem of
manually determining which tank it was and feeding this
data to the computer so that it could complete its hit and
miss recording and print the results.
At this point we may combine all of the material pre-
viously discussed and describe the attack course which would











Be prepared to con-
tinue the attack.
Figure 6
Our attack implies aggressor defense which is typically laid
out in depth with the following dimensions.
FM 30-102. Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces
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The principal segment of the belt pattern is the main defense
belt manned by motorized rifle divisions; therefore, we will
assume that elements of this type division constitute the
normal aggressor defensive force for our experiment.
Within the main defense belts aggressor motorized rifle
battalions organize three lines. A cross section would show
two platoons of a company in the first defense line and the
third platoon in the second. Second echelon companies place
all three platoons abreast in the third defense line. A
platoon of two antitank guns or recoilless rifles and a
platoon of three tanks is normally attached to the first line
companies. Organic weapons include rifles, automatic
FM 30-102. Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces
(Department of the Army , January 1963)
, pp . 105-107
.
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weapons and rocket launchers.
The overall appearance to the attacking force would be
one of a series of defensive positions organized in depth
which would appear randomly to the right and left front and
center of the direction of the attack. In the instrumenta-
tion section we will discuss how targets will be positioned
and operated; at this time we will assume they would appear
at random ranges but generally at greater ranges at the start
of the exercise with range decreasing as that exercise pro-
gresses. The relative range between the firing platoon and
target would be kept within a 200 meter bracket for a partic-
ular engagement principally by the computer's target control
program. However, the test director's staff, acting as the
company headquarters, may have to impose restrictions on the
spot to prevent the test platoon from simply charging the
objective at top speed without stopping to fire the main gun.
After the platoon passes through the 600 meter bracket, it
is expected that the platoon will close rapidly on the ob-
jective using machine gun fire to kill or suppress the enemy.
Prior to reaching this bracket, the test platoon should use
its band of maneuver room to advantage to include such tech-
niques as firing from a primary position and then moving to
an alternate one to continue firing. It is expected the
main gun engagement at the 600 meter bracket would be rela-
tively brief.
The US attack is characterized by as much detailed plan-
ning and reconnaissance as time and the situation permit.
It differs principally from the meeting engagement in this
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respect. Supporting weapons, including artillery, mortars
and tactical air are employed to soften up the enemy. (These
supporting weapons are simulated in our experiment.) Intel-
ligence agencies attempt to locate aggressor positions and
identify their activity. The night attack may be contrasted
with the day attack in terms of the depth of the objective.
At night the objective is more limited and the attack is more
deliberate in execution due to the somewhat restricted visi-
bility.
Now let us take a look at what a typical platoon would
experience in the day attack and then point out any differ-
ences peculiar to the night and the limited visibility
attacks
.
At some time, perhaps 12 to 24 hours prior to the attack,
the test director's staff acting as the company commander,
would issue a warning order to the platoon that a move would
be made to a forward assembly area in preparation for an
attack which is expected to be launched at h-hour on d-day
through friendly front lines. Operations orders would follow,
the move would be made, final preparations and reconnaissance
would be completed. In the assembly area the acting company
commander would issue the attack order which would require
the test platoon to seize two objectives during the day and
be prepared to continue to the third. During the night
attack the test platoon would be ordered to seize one objec-
tive and be prepared to continue the attack at first light.
The limited visibility attacks would be quite similar. With
the dawn attack, the test platoon would move forward to the
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line of departure under the last moments of darkness and com-
mence the attack in semi-darkness which would turn to day by
the time it reached the first objective. Thereafter the
pattern would be the same as the day attack. The dusk attack
would commence as the light begins to fade and would be a
night attack by the time the test platoon reaches the first
objective, which may be located somewhat deeper into enemy
terrain than the strictly night attack. As in the night
attack, the test platoon would be prepared to continue the
attack at first light. Although the experimental course
would not include measurements for the be prepared phase, it
would be good training to occasionally order the platoon to
begin the execution of the be prepared mission to keep them
on their toes.
In all attacks, typical radio traffic with the simulated
company headquarters and the artillery forward observer would
be conducted as part of the stress environment.
During the attack targets would initiate cues and give
reaction signatures to firers who would in turn respond as
the situation dictated. This means the target must stop
moving when a mobility kill is achieved, stop firing when a
firepower kill is achieved, emit smoke to simulate a total
kill when the target tank is set afire, etc., as we have dis-
cussed.
Now we have considered the attack phase in some detail.
We can move to the meeting engagement and discuss it by way
of contrast with the attack. The first point which should
be made is that the meeting engagement should be tested over
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different terrain than the attack to prevent contamination
of the data obtained. Because the stress environment is so
important to the outcome of the experiment, we should vary the
test course between the attack and meeting engagement enough
to ensure that they do not have a detailed first hand know-
ledge of the terrain.
After the platoon is issued a warning order followed by
an operation order, the meeting engagement should commence
with the test platoon in march column acting as an advance
guard for a larger force which is following as the main body.
Aggressor would be deployed in depth as in the attack and
would consist of the standard test targets already described.
When the engagement is commenced the test platoon should be
ordered to maneuver to one flank or the other and commence
their attack. (Which flank would be assigned to which pla-
toon would be randomly selected but would be equally divided
and whichever flank is assigned should coincide with the
tactical situation so that it is a logical course of action)
.
The test platoon must develop its plan of attack rapidly
and commence the attack. After it overran the opposition,
it would be ordered to reform and continue its advance guard
mission. The night meeting engagement would be virtually
the same as the day situation just described except one half
of the units would employ infra-red searchlight to provide
illumination, while the other half used Xenon searchlight
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The defense is characterized by deliberately prepared
positions and a mission to hold certain key terrain. The
test platoon would be permitted time to carefully reconnoiter
their area of responsibility and prepare firing positions and
range cards. Therefore, it is not felt necessary that the
day and night defense be run on different terrain. The man-
ner in which the targets would be presented would be changed
between the day and night tests. Since aggressor would be
attacking, tanks and armored personnel carriers would be
appropriate targets. Aggressor normally stays mounted in
their carriers until the last possible moment at which time
they dismount and continue the attack on foot. At this time
pop-up targets would simulate the dismounted infantry.
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Relative motion with the dismounted infantry targets may be
achieved through the target control program which would
cause the more distant targets to drop and somewhat nearer
targets to appear.
The platoon would be permitted to engage the enemy
during the day defense at greater range than 2000 meters if
terrain and visibility permit and the tank gunnery qualifi-
cation course firing shows it would be profitable to add
another sample range of about 2400 meters.
We have already observed that aggressor would attack
in mass with an advantage of some 5 or 6:1. Our tanks will
engage targets appearing in their subsector. The first time
the targets appear they would be within a 200 meter firing
bracket; therefore, intervisibility equals threat and starts
the time distribution clocks. Aggressor would take maximum
advantage of the terrain. If our gunners kill all of the
targets in a subsector, the computer would override its
normal program and cause at least one remaining target in
each subsector to advance so that we can sample at each
range. The statistical control would require the platoon to
fire only in prescribed range brackets.
The night and limited visibility defense test would use
the same proportions of IR, Xenon searchlight and howitzer







The delay is similar in many respects to the defense
except the unit executing the delay does not intend to hold
key terrain at all costs, but rather trade space for time.
Until the time comes to withdraw before becoming decisively
engaged, the techniques employed in the delay at platoon
level parallel the defense.
In our experiment we would require the test platoon to
occupy two delaying positions and then make a passage back
through friendly lines. As in the defense the platoon would
be permitted to engage during the day delay at longer range
if the conditions described are met.
Because we do not desire the test platoon to become
decisively engaged, only tank and armored personnel carrier
targets should be required.
The night and limited visibility delay would be executed
with the same proportion of IR, Xenon searchlight and/or
howitzer fired illuminating rounds as in the attack. It is
expected that the maximum range at which the test platoon
can first effectively engage the targets at night or limited
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The instrumentation to gather time distribution and
hit data has been described in some detail already. Basic-
ally an array of electronic equipment notes events and
signals a high speed, large memory capacity, digital compu-
ter which records all events and drives the target control
program. It is hoped that little data must be hand recorded
and fed into the computer but that automatic recorders can
handle the entire task except checking tank like targets to
ensure they were engaged only by main gun ammo. A few more
comments are in order to complete our discussion of instru-
mentation.
In the target identification phase very, very high
frequency (line of sight) transmitter and receiver combina-
tions mounted on target and firing tanks respectively will
note and relay to the computer the time when intervisibility
exists. Targets will not be made intervisible unless they
are capable of being a threat; thus, the time of intervisi-
bility equals the time of initial threat.
It will be necessary to place an electronic switch
in the tank by the commander and each member of the crew to
provide the impulse to record when the tank commander or a
crew member first detects and subsequently identifies a
potential target, as no mechanical mechanism on the tank
moves at this time which could trip a switch.
The target complexes have been described in detail.
The tank or tank size targets should be capable of movement
and must record rather precisely the point at which a round
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hits or misses the vehicle in relation to some known refer-
ence point on the vehicle. The sensing array should be
capable of making accurate sensings for tracks perpendicular,
parallel and at a 45 degree angle to the gun target line.
Targets would not take more than one track during any one
tactical situation; therefore, the array could be set be-
fore a test began and would not have to be changed during
a run.
Due to the arch effect in the HEP-T trajectory the aim-
ing error can be better measured by using seismic devices
to sense the location of the detonation which will permit
us to obtain the aiming error statistics desired described
in the vertical plane.
The target control program should be set to randomize
the appearance of targets and should present roughly an
equal number to the test platoon's right and left front and
center. Although the location where a set of targets appears
to the test platoon varies, the set should include the same
number of targets for each range situation for each platoon
to provide an underlying basis for statistical comparison.
The number of targets is somewhat a random variable.
In the defense and delay there was little problem because
the targets start at the far range bracket and continue to
move forward by bounds. The number is fixed after the test
director decides on aggressor's numerical advantage. The
attack is a different problem. The requirement is to place
out enough targets so that we get at least 30 first round
trials and 30 second round trials for each situation. Until
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the ammo limitation is set and the cost of instrumentation
is fixed, it is difficult to be more specific than to say
we want aggressor to have a defense in depth.
We have previously discussed the fact that the principal
gun camera "sees" the same thing the gunner does through his
periscope. The cal..50 poses a particular problem in that
the TC cupola is free swinging with respect to the turret
and hence the gunner's gun camera; therefore an additional
camera must be mounted coaxially with the cal..50 to deter-
mine what target was engaged and what general aiming point
was selected from observing the tracers.
A round counter circuit must be installed on each weapon
on each vehicle to signal the computer when that gun fires.
And finally, we will want to record the interphone
conversation in each tank to back up the detection and
identification sensings, and the radio traffic on the platoon
and company command nets.
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6. Presentation of the Data
After the data has been analyzed and reduced, results
should be tabled in a looseleaf handbook for the 105 mm gun
tank. In general, the initial section of the handbook
should list technical performance data which has already
been developed by the Army's Ballistic Research Laborator-
ies at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. The second section should
contain the OHP data listed by type of combat, caliber of
weapon, ammo, state of target movement, range, visibility
and round sequence. Within each subsection identified by
type of combat through visibility, we would place (1) the
distribution of time from first intervisibility to detec-
tion, (2) the distribution of time from detection to
identification (when this can be determined), (3) the dis-
tribution of time from identification to first engagement
(in the defense this applies to the far range bracket only
and in the offense, defense or delay this applies only when
the target is within a range firing bracket at the time of
identification)
, (4) the distribution of time to fire the
second, third and successive rounds (main gun only) , (5)
the distribution of time during which suppressive machine
gun fire was placed in the target area and the percentage of
the area covered by this fire, and (6) the average speed at
which the platoon is able to close on the objective in the
case of offensive maneuvers.
The hit or effects data presented in the OHP section
in this proposal is confined to only two types of main gun
rounds and two types of machine gun rounds. (However, the
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looseleaf feature allows the addition of follow-on results,
should the full blown program be ordered executed.) HEAT
and HEP were selected because they present two different
problems in target sensing and presentation of the data.
We have discussed how OHP would be obtained for HEAT
ammunition. Using this method we can describe confidence
intervals on the hit and kill probabilities. HEP is an
explosive round and as such achieves an expected fraction
of casualties for a certain density of personnel and their
posture. Therefore, it will be necessary to combine the
dispersion of the aiming error, gun-target range and the
angle of impact with data available at BRL to develop con-
fidence intervals on the expected fraction of casualties
based on normal aggressor weapons employment and density of
troops.
If the pulse doppler radar devices currently under
development are available in quantity during the time of
this experiment, we will be able to identify the targets hit
by maching gun fire and thereby estimate the fractional
coverage by "X" number of rounds fired when all of the pre-
viously mentioned conditions have been fixed. It may be
necessary to settle for less precise methods. An alterna-
tive method would be to compare the HEP expected fraction
of casualties with the number of hits obtained on the
silhouette targets and arrive at the machine gun hits by
approximating the difference. (To say the least, accurate
evaluation of machine gun fire in this experiment may require
further instrumentation development and assessment techniques
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Within each section of type of combat through target
movement we should describe the degree of underkill or over-
kill if it existed. In effect we are describing the degrad-
ation factor, if any, that comes as a result of massing
firepower in a stress situation.
The final section should contain the product of the
conditional kill data (listed as part of the technical per-
formance data) and the OHP data to give a section called
the unconditional kill section. This final section should
contain the same breakout for subsections as were made in
the OHP section with the additional feature of listing kills
by type, i.e., mobility, firepower and total. The time
distributions described for the OHP section would not be
repeated. An additional distribution would be included;
the distribution of time from first engagement until a kill
was achieved or the target was rendered ineffective.
We have provided researchers, planners and war gamers
with time distributions, hit and kill data derived from ob-
serving a 105 mm gun tank platoon operating in a simulated
combat environment. We have included the theoretical data
for the tank which has been developed by BRL. Thus we feel
we have combined all of the knowledge and empirical observa-
tion available on this weapons system into one package for
ease of use in making cost effectiveness studies, conducting
war games using such devices as Carmonette (RAC) [17] or
Dyntacs (Ohio State University) [3] , or a whole host of uses
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7. Costs
In analyzing the costs we should consider sunk,
variable and fixed (or mixed) costs that would be chargeable
to the agency conducting the experiment and consider sep-
arately the additional costs which the decision maker must
consider when he evaluates the overall cost of obtaining
OHP for the M-60 tank system.
In the sunk category goes the cost of the computer.
This item will be purchased for general use and will have
already been paid for by the time frame assumed in this
paper. It is anticipated the computer will have excess
capacity; therefore, opportunity costs are assumed to be
zero. Likewise the firing range and post facilities have
already been paid and are therefore sunk costs.
The variable costs are ammo; the operation and main-
tenance of vehicles, weapons and instrumented target systems;
personnel pay and allowances less travel pay; POL; and data
processing and editing and publication of the looseleaf
handbook. Each of these costs varies as a function of the
length of the experiment or the number of platoon experi-
mental runs.
Relatively fixed (or we might say mixed) costs which
do not depend on the length or number of runs in the experi-
ment are personnel travel pay; equipment transportation
costs; and the cost of developing and fabricating the
instrumentation. From the last cost must be subtracted
the expected future value to other experiments.
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Each of the above costs is relatively easy to compute
when the final experimental plan is prepared and negotia-
tions are completed with Continental Army Command for the
specific troops and test facility which they must provide.
Total cost is a summation of the variable and fixed costs.
Further definition of specific costs is therefore
deferred to the completion of the final experimental plan.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, ammunition costs
do not bear directly on the agency conducting the experiment;
however, the opportunity costs for the ammunition, which we
assumed to be the replacement cost for new rounds, should
be added to the aforementioned experimental cost to yield
the grand total price tag for obtaining M-60 tank system
OHP . Because tank systems are quite similar in design, one
may easily infer (with some minor substitutions for such
things as the difference in cost of ammunition) what it
would cost to evaluate the M-48, the predecessor of the M-60,
or the MBT-70, the tank system under design at this time as
the follow-on to the M-60.
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8. Conclusions
This thesis has presented a methodology for obtaining
operational hit probability and unconditional kill given hit
data. The test subjects required, the courses to be run,
the measurements to be taken, the sensors required and the
costs involved were described. It is felt that this experi-
mental course or one similar will adequately measure OHP
on any terrain where M-60 tanks (or other models) would be
employed. The types of rounds of ammunition could be readily
expanded and more range measurements could be taken, as the
program budget permits. An underlying assumption is that
the instrumentation is semi-portable and will permit a
"change of scenery" without great difficulty.
By sacrificing some of the realism it is believed
this test program could be fielded with the current inventory
of instrumentation if antitank rounds can be sensed for
location of hits and misses.
Costs are readily identifiable; therefore, the re-
sults of the experiment should provide the decision maker
with a cost-benefit analysis upon which to decide the future
of the OHP program.
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The computation of an estimated number of trials for
each set of conditions, in particular range, may be readily
evaluated by using the following relationships where:
S = the number of successes in n independent
Bernoulli trials.
p = the probability of success on each trial.
q = 1-p = the probability of failure on each
trial
.
a = the lower bound on the probability of
observing p to within some arbitrary
difference
.
e = the arbitrary difference in absolute value.
S
n 1
F =— = the relative frequency of success,
$,<j>= standard normal distribution, density
functions respectively
.
P[|S -np|//npq < h] = 2$(h)-l
or P[|f
-p| £ e] = 2$ (e/n/pq) -1
Now define K(a) as the solution to the equation
K(a)












K 2 (a) /4e
1,
"E. Parzen, Modern Probability Theory and its
Applications
,
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965),
pp. 231-2.
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Assuming that 90% of the time we desire to estimate p





The procedure is identical for computing the hit proba-
bility for the defense and the delay.
If p is either greater than about .8 or less than about
.2, which may occur at short or very long ranges respect-
ively, the normal approximation is not very accurate for
estimating n. An alternative approach would be the Poisson
approximation to the binomial to estimate the number of
trials required.
It is noted that in this argument the underlying
distribution is binomial, whereas- in actually obtaining
an estimate of a particular p from observing the outcomes
of tank firings, we will use the normal distribution and
integrate over the target area. The assumption made is
that the number of rounds required to obtain an estimate of
p in the case of sampling from a binomial distribution is
sufficiently close to the number required to get the same
degree of accuracy in the case of estimating a bivariate
normal distribution, and then integrating the sampled dis-
tribution.
If the recommendation of eight platoons (of five tanks
each) is approved, we can expect to have 40 or more rounds
fired at each data coordinate which is 33-1/3% more than
the desired minimum determined by the above model.
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APPENDIX B
During the experiment after half of the firing platoons
have completed the four simulated combat courses the test
director should have a statistical comparison made between
the estimated probability of hit for the attack and the
meeting engagement and similarly between the defense and
the delay to test the hypothesis that in each case the prob-
ability of hit is the same for a particular range, type of
ammunition, round sequence number, state of target movement
and visibility condition. Thus in the case of the attack
and the meeting engagement, we would perform the following
analysis for first and also second rounds assuming the
number of trials is respectively sufficiently large and
therefore the difference in the two sample proportions will
be approximately normally distributed. The p's are deter-
mined by integration techniques outlined in Appendix C.
Definitions. (1) p = estimated probability of
a hit in the attack for a
specific range, type of
ammo, round sequence number,
state of target movement and
visibility condition.
(2) p = estimated probability of a
hit in the meeting engage-
ment - same conditions as
noted in (1) above.
(3) n, = rounds fired in the attack,
conditions as noted in (1)
above
.
(4) n„ = rounds fired in the meeting
engagement, conditions as
noted in (1) above.
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H~: P = P , H: p ^ p






















The recommended decision rule is that if for our assumed
significance level of .10
|6 - 6 | < 1,645a. A1 ^a m ' p -pra mti
holds for both first and second rounds, respectively, we
would accept the hypothesis that the probability of a hit
for attack and meeting engagement (under similar conditions)
are equal and discontinue further testing of the meeting
engagement for that set of conditions.




From the sample data the operational standard devia-
tions, the components of which are assumed to be normally
distributed, and correlation coefficients of aiming error
may be estimated by the following formulas. If we assume
the main gun was boresighted and zeroed according to
accepted doctrine then the expected strike of a round is
the aiming point. We will arbitrarily designate the center
of the y-z plane as the center of the mass. Then we may
compute the following statistics with regard to the
specified reference point. The multivariate normal dis-
tribution will be centered at Y and Z as measured from
the reference point. Thus we estimate
-h X (yi"?)21=1
Where n - number of rounds fired for a particular
situation and range
y. = distance in the "y" direction from the refer-
ence point to the point in the y-z plane where
the round passed through the plane.
l
n
v = — V v = defined similarly to z below2 n . L ~ J i
1 = 1
In like manner we may compute
d 2 = ± I (z.-zVz n . L n ii=l
Where n = as before
z. = distance in the "z" direction from the refer-
i
ence point to the point in the y-z plane where
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the round passed through the plane.
1 ?
z = — ) z. = distance in the "z" direction from
n . L .. 1i=l
the reference point to where the average of all
n rounds passed through the plane.
From the above we may obtain
6 = /3T , 8 = /$2
y y and z z
Using the same data we may estimate the correlation
coefficient, p, which is a measure of the interrelationship
between y and z components of an individual round fired.
(Note p does not measure any interrelationship between two
different rounds, in fact it assumes independence. £ is
defined as
n
P = EFT" .Vi"7) (Zi_I)y z i=l
p may take on values such that 0<|j3|<l. Small absolute
values of p, e.g., | j3 | < . 2 , tend to indicate independence of
the y and z values for a given round; whereas, large
absolute values, e.g., |p|>.8 tend to indicate dependence
of the y and z values.
A test of the hypothesis, Ho, that y and z values of
an individual round are independent would be performed as
follows
.
We calculate t = p/rv^T/Zl-p 2
From a "Student's" t table we look up the value for
(l-a/2,n-2) where a is the level of significance,




<t,,_ /2 _ 2 \ we accept the hypo-
thesis y and z are independent for an individual round;
otherwise we reject H .J o
If the result of the correlation test is to accept Hr o
the total OHP for a given situation and range may be com-
puted by integrating using the following formula.
p = / 2*1 a exp f" 7[(y-y)
2/^+(z-z) 2 /a^](
Area of y z y
the target
If we break up the target into rectangles and express
y and z in standard form, we may refer to a standard normal
table and readily compute the probability associated with
a respective rectangle and then sum the rectangles.
If we reject H the total OHP for a given situationJ o y
may be computed using the following method.
The general procedure is adapted from reference [1] ,
Appendix D.3, which describes a computer program for the
IBM 7094 using FAP language and was written by Mr. Richard
Freedman. The program computes about 70 points per second
and has six-deciman accuracy.
The procedure is to make a substitution for the general
bivariate normal distribution f( y 1 , z' ) by substituting
our estimated parameters




to give a bivariate normal distribution with zero means,
unit variances and correlation coefficient p. We now have
f(y,z) = i/? GXPl"?n-AM [y
2
-2pyz+z 2 ] }




k" 1 = 2i\/T^pz
f(y,z) = k exP{- 2( i-^2) [(ypz)
2
+ z
2 (l-p 2 )]}
or
f(y,z) = k exp (-z 2 /2) exp [-^g|ly]
then d b < /v » 2




















G(Y) = /(1//2?) exp(-t 2 /2)dt
Mr. Freedman ' s program uses the above simplification and
Hasting 's approximately to evaluate G.
A helpful expression to be used in evaluation G(y) is
G(y) =<
\ + i$(y//2) if y >
\ - |$(-y//I) if y <
where
$(t) = 1 - (1 + 0.278393t + 0.230389t'
+ 0.000972t 3 + 0.078108t 4 )" 4
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This procedure evaluates the probability of a hit in a
rectangle. To evaluate p for a particular target we would
break up the target into a number of rectangles, calculate
the probability of hitting each rectangle and sum over all
the rectangles.
Thus, for n rectangles
n
P = £ P.
i=l 1
where p^ is calculated by substituting the appropriate
limits for a, b, c and d.
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APPENDIX D
Although it is suggested there may be an interaction
between range, visibility, the sequence number of the round
and the state of target movement, it is quite reasonable
to expect there is no four or three factor interaction.
It may well be that a test will show there is no two factor
interaction when we look at the estimated hit probabilities.
If this is the case we should further test within the
two basic types of main gun rounds, antitank and anti-
personnel, to determine if the level of any one (or more)
of the five remaining factors has no effect on hit probabil-
ity. For each factor for which we may accept the hypothesis
that its main effect is zero, we would average hit
probability over that factor and thereby improve our esti-
mate of p due to increased sample size.
A general discussion of the N-way classification with
interaction and the appropriate analysis of variance may
be found in An Introduction to Linear Statistical Models
,
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